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Abstract: This article engages with the understudied phenomenon of the Òdisinterested, 
denouncingÓ (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) or ÒindifferentÓ (Ragazzi 2009) diaspora state. 
Focusing on US citizens abroad, the article argues that there is negative diasporic outreach on 
the part of the stateÑÒdisinterestedÓ from the stateÕs perspective, but ÒdenouncingÓ from that 
of the diaspora. Negative diasporic outreach is exemplified by the 2010 FATCA legislation, 
which sought to root out tax evaders resident in the US, but has, instead, affected millions of 
American emigrants through increased financial control and the repercussions of those 
policies, and has resulted in sharply higher citizenship renunciation figures. Impact on an 
American diaspora was not considered in the lawÕs proposal, debate and passage into law. 
Second, the article argues that this negative diasporic outreach, in combination with the 
continued facilitation of the right to vote, is a reflection of the inclusion of these American 
emigrants in the American state, but their simultaneous exclusion from the American nation.  
 












 More than half of the worldÕs states have established institutions dedicated to the 
inclusion of diasporas (Gamlen 2014; Arrighi and Lafleur this issue), and more than 80% 
allow or facilitate extra-territorial voting (Collyer and Vathi 2007), a trend which has 
accelerated since 2000. Governments have granted their citizens living abroad the right to 
vote and to hold dual citizenship, provided for direct representation in parliaments, facilitated 
the sending of remittances, formally and ceremonially recognised their contributions to the 
country, and more. Mexico and the Philippines are well-known examples of countries which 
have shifted from seeing emigrants as deserters or traitors to actively supporting them 
(Durand 2004; Rodriguez 2002), and many others, including Global North and classic 
immigration countries, have done so as well (Gray 2006; Larner 2007; Collyer 2013, 17-8).  
This international trend, arguably a normative shift (Gamlen 2014; Lafleur 2015, 846), 
toward statesÕ engagement with diasporas is a strong one, yet the parallel phenomenon of 
some statesÕ lack of engagement with their diasporas remains understudied. This article fills a 
gap in the literature on these ÒindifferentÓ (Ragazzi 2009) or Òdisinterested, denouncingÓ 
states (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Boccagni et al. 2016). 
 This article examines the relationship between the United States and its estimated 9 
million citizens abroad (US Department of State 2016) Ñemigrants, diaspora or overseas 
Americans. While the US encourages other diasporas to engage with their countries of origin 
and to contribute economically and politically (e.g. US Department of State 2014; Levitt and 
Lamba-Nieves 2011), there is no consistent or institutionalised engagement by the United 
States with its own overseas population as a distinct diaspora. Its policies vis--vis its 
overseas population reflect Òmulti-tieredÓ policies which have been shown to exist in other 
cases, such as Egypt (Tsourapas 2015), with support and assistance provided to all US 
citizens overseas; the service provision is, however, tailored for those who are conceived of 
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as being overseas temporarily. In the 1960s and 1970s, overseas Americans1 lobbied for the 
right to vote and won that right in 1975 (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014; Michaux 1996; 
Smith 2014). TodayÕs relationship is, however, characterised by what might be called 
negative diasporic outreach, constituted in large part by the increased financial control of 
those overseas citizens by the 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (ÒFATCAÓ, a play 
on the term Òfat catÓ). TodayÕs lobbying by overseas Americans is directed at revising or 
repealing that legislation.  
This article argues that the seeming contradiction between the continued facilitation 
of overseas AmericansÕ right to vote on the one hand and focused financial control on the 
other reflects the inclusion of this American diaspora in the American state, with their full 
rights as citizens recognised, but their exclusion from the American nation, or national 
narrative, here conceptualised as an Òimagined communityÓ (Anderson 2006). In addition to 
the financial control, the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion is reflected in the contrast 
between the protections and assistance offered to overseas citizens, including the right to 
vote, but a lack of programs addressing the concerns of a long-term emigrant population. 
Their political rights are, in most cases, assured (see Arrighi and Lafleur, this issue), but 
policies or programs acknowledging their value to the broader idea of America are lacking. 
Overseas Americans themselves note that they are not seen, either in popular or in 
government imagination, as a coherent diasporic population, nor are they included in any 
understanding of what constitutes the American nation. This conclusion supports Levitt and 
Glick SchillerÕs (2004) argument that transnational engagement Òrejects the long-held notion 
that society and the nation-state are one and the sameÓ (1003) as well as their finding that the 
stateÕs Òarrangements [vis--vis a diaspora] are by no means staticÓ (Levitt and Glick Schiller 
2004, 1024). Similarly, the lack of specific inclusion for American emigrants reflects 
                                                
1 This paper uses the term ÔAmericanÕ interchangeably with ÔUS citizenÕ, while recognising that ÔAmericanÕ also 
refers to others from North, Central and South America.
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BloemraadÕs argument that the United States fails to emphasize the Òsymbolic meaningÓ 
(2006, 139) of inclusive citizenship for different migrant groups. Full diaspora membership 
implies belonging both with the rights of a formal citizen, as well as inclusion in the 
Òimagined communityÓ of the nation. The American diaspora is included only in a narrow, 
not in a broad, understanding of citizenship.  
After a review of key literature, this paper discusses the profile of the US diaspora, 
drawing on a survey (closed and open-ended questions) conducted December 2014-January 
2015 (N=1546, see Data and Methods below). Second, it reviews the FATCA legislation and 
its role in record high numbers of post-2010 American citizenship renunciation. Although it 
is not explicitly a diasporic institution (Gamlen 2014, S183; Ho and Yeoh 2015, 154), 
FATCA extends domestic governance internationally through its explicit inclusion of all 
foreign businesses and bank accounts owned by ÒUS persons.Ó The article then analyses 
qualitative survey responses, demonstrating the impact of the negative diasporic outreach on 
the American diaspora. 
Diaspora  
Eventual return and forcible dispersion are no longer core components of todayÕs 
understanding of diaspora. The conceptual overlap between ÒdiasporaÓ and Òtransnationally-
engaged communityÓ is also decreasing, with suggestions that Australians (Hugo 2006), 
Britons (Finch et al. 2010, 6) or US citizens abroad (Croucher 2012; Klekowski von 
Koppenfels 2014) could constitute diasporas. Ultimately, we can be comfortable in 
understanding ÒdiasporaÓ as a population dispersed across multiple locations and having a 
distinct sense of identity both as a group and vis--vis the country of origin across those 
multiple locations (cf. Dufoix 2008; Faist 2010; Butler 2001, 192; Gamlen 2013; Mirilovic 
2016). 
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State engagement with the diaspora  
In the past, emigrants were often seen as traitorous, ungrateful or simply absent by 
both origin governments and populations (see Baubck 2003; Gamlen 2008; Klekowski von 
Koppenfels 2014, 234). Fewer and fewer countries hold this view, as countries have shifted 
from the denunciation of emigrant citizens to inclusion and awareness of mutual benefit 
(Boccagni et al. 2016; Dlano and Gamlen 2014). Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) categorise 
state-diaspora relationships in three ways: some states have included their emigrants both 
economically and politically, becoming ÒTransnational Nation States,Ó while the more 
common ÒStrategic, Selective StateÓ engages with its diaspora in selected ways, perhaps 
economic or political, whether through bases of legal inclusion or established programs 
(1023). The third type of state, increasingly rare, is the ÒDisinterested, Denouncing StateÓ for 
whom migrants Òare seen as having abandoned the homeland or even as traitors to its causeÓ 
(1024), with Cuba as one example. Ragazzi categorises the United States as an Òindifferent 
state É characterized by a general lack of interest to its population abroadÓ (2014, 81) and 
notes that such states, including Belgium and Nigeria, remain understudied in the area of 
diaspora engagement. Ho (2011) notes, on the other hand, that many states have at least two 
diaspora policies: they may celebrate some migrants, such as the highly skilled, or members 
of one ethnic or religious group, while ÒneglectingÓ others.  
Although there is a strong emphasis within the diaspora engagement literature on 
remittance-sending and such phenomena as hometown association contributions (e.g. Horst 
2008; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), Dlano and Gamlen (2014) note that financial 
remittances are only one of many reasons for state engagement with a diaspora. Levitt and 
Glick Schiller similarly note that origin states maintain or (re-)establish links with their 
diasporas to encourage remittances, strengthen trade ties, or because they hope diasporas can 
further their interests abroad (2004).  
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Economic factors or remittances are not, Lafleur finds, a complete explanation for 
enfranchisement (2011, 498; also Collyer 2014, 66). Diaspora inclusion is not necessarily 
instrumental; a changed understanding of the state and community can also explain a shift 
from disinterested or indifferent states to transnationally engaged ones (Ragazzi 2009). This 
shift occurs, Ragazzi argues, as the concept of belonging moves from being marked by 
territorial belonging, i.e. within the state, to being citizenship-based, or within the nation, 
which, in turn, legitimises transnational engagement (2009, 391).  
Not all state diasporic outreach is positive; Collyer notes that while most diasporic 
outreach is a question of providing services, some states are engaged in enforcing obligations, 
usually financial, or even engaging in Òsurveillance and controlÓ (2014, 64). While Ho notes 
that states may engage in different ways with different diaspora groups (2011), Dlano and 
Gamlen (2014) caution against approaches to diaspora engagement which portray the state as 
a unitary actor (45). A state can, then, both engage its diaspora and, at the same time, seek to 
control it; the US case exemplifies this tension.  
Diaspora and state interactions 
Widely accepted explanations for emergence and activism of diasporas reflect both 
economic and political elements. Migrants may engage transnationally in order to increase 
status in the country of origin (Fitzgerald 2004), engage in an ongoing conflict, whether as 
Òpeace-makersÓ or Òpeace-breakers,Ó or seek to overthrow a regime or enjoy a newfound 
freedom of speech (¯stergaard-Nielsen 2000; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Adamson 2002; 
Gamlen et al. 2013). The destination country can play a role in diaspora engagement; reactive 
transnationalismÑwhether economic or political engagement with the country of origin or 
increased identificationÑcan emerge as a result of discrimination or negative context of 
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reception in the host country (Itzigsohn and Giorguli Saucedo 2002, 772; ¯stergaard-Nielsen 
2001, 263). 
Background 
Two tensions shape overseas AmericansÕ relationship with the state: that between 
temporary and permanent migrants, and that between political inclusion and financial control. 
In the United States, the popular and government view continues to be that departure from 
the US is expected to be a temporary overseas relocation. Temporary migrants study or work 
abroad, may perhaps be on intra-company transfers, or on humanitarian, military or religious 
missions, with the experience seen as strengthening their value upon return to the United 
States. The concept of a voluntary long-term emigrant who remains a loyal and/or engaged 
citizen is counter-intuitive in the American national narrative. For the US, long-term 
emigrants have been seen as draft-dodgers, tax-evaders or political dissenters (Hardwick 
2010). Both the US government and population struggle with the concept of an American 
emigrant or diaspora population; they are HoÕs ÒneglectedÓ diaspora. In the case of the 
United States, its strong and integral identity as both an historical and contemporary 
immigration nation, even if contested under a Trump presidency, combines with a continued 
lack of identity as an emigration state and, indeed, no understanding of having any 
emigration at all, to shape its relationship with its emigrants in a selectively exclusionary 
way.  
The second tension is that of the formal relationship with the state. Political inclusion 
in the stateÑenfranchisementÑwas achieved in 1975 within an extension of rights in a 
domestic civil rights context in response to lobbying by the overseas population. That 
extension of the franchise built on military service membersÕ right to vote, with others living 
abroad included on the basis of equal rights (Smith 2014, 39). FATCA, which sought to root 
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out tax evaders residing in the US and investing overseas, passed without reference to, or 
seemingly reflection on, the US diaspora, reflects the continued exclusion of the diaspora 
from the nation, or national narrative. 
The State Department assists and facilitates voting, as does the Foreign Vote 
Assistance Program (FVAP), located in the Department of Defense. Consular officials hold 
briefings on voter registration and reach out to overseas American community groups for that 
purpose. The outreach varies from year to year and from country to country. The State 
Department assists destitute travellers, provides alerts for those travelling, issues passports, 
registers births abroad and much more. Individual efforts may be undertaken, whether 
support of artistsÕ work or select issuance of coveted invitations to Fourth of July 
celebrations, but there is not, nor has there been, an institutionalised governmental outreach 
to an American diaspora. 
In explaining overseas American engagement, Klekowski von Koppenfels argued that 
identity and reactive transnationalism played key roles in their transnational political 
engagement (2014, 174). Lacking a uniform ethnic identity, Americans draw instead on a 
sense of civic identity for motivation to vote, using this participation in the state to reify their 
national identity (cf. Bloemraad 2006). Secondly, identified and visible as Americans during 
the US-led Iraq War starting in 2003, many in Europe felt compelled to become politically 
active to demonstrate their opposition to the war as Americans, in a clear case of reactive 
transnationalism (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). Many within the US diaspora feel that 
they serve as ÒinformalÓ or ÒunknownÓ ambassadors (Michaux 1996), in short, furthering US 
interests abroad, serving its Ògeostrategic interestsÓ (Mylonas and Žilović, this issue). 
However, their own perception of their role is at odds with a lack of a widespread recognition 
in the United States that overseas Americans still belong to the American nation and can, and 
do, further American interests abroad. This is a clear contrast to the conceptualisation of, for 
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example, the Haitian diaspora as HaitiÕs Òtenth departmentÓ (Glick Schiller and Fouron 
1999).  
While Collyer argues that the inclusion of emigrants in the national narrative enables 
their inclusion in democratic institutions (2013, 17), for overseas Americans, inclusion in 
democratic institutionsÑenfranchisementÑhas taken place, but inclusion in the national 
narrative lags behind. A stateÕs self-identity, and identification of its Òpeople,Ó is an integral 
part of the diaspora inclusion process (Collyer 2014; Ho 2011), both for states which 
acknowledge and include their diasporas, and for those which do not.  
Data and methods 
This article draws on data from an opt-in online qualitative survey of US citizens and 
former citizens living outside the United States (N=1546) from 5 December 2014 to 20 
January 2015. The survey had 1546 responses; 1399 were US citizens (90.3%) and 147 
former US citizens (9.7%). The survey link was initially distributed via email and social 
media through existing networks and to new contacts. These networks included both 
individuals and organisations. From those initial contacts, the survey link was shared 
numerous times via social media and the link was posted on several well-visited blogs.  
The survey was entitled ÔThe United States and You Ð A Survey for US Citizens and 
Former US CitizensÕ and explained: 
There has been a great deal in the news recently about US citizens giving up their US 
passports, but these reports are largely based on anecdotal evidence and not on 
systematic research. This survey seeks to fill that gap, and explore, from a research 
perspective, what factors are playing a role in US overseas citizensÕ thought processes 
on maintaining or renouncing US citizenship.  
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Insofar, FATCA was mentioned neither in the description nor in survey questions, but did 
emerge as a central point in participantsÕ open-ended responses. The survey included both 
closed- and open-ended questions. Responses to open-ended questions were substantial (1422 
responses, with many individual responses stretching onto several pages). Insofar, to 
facilitate analysis, a data reduction technique was used and a representative sub-sample of ten 
percent of the overall qualitative survey responses selected. Data were sorted by response to 
the question ÒHave you ever thought about renouncing US citizenship?Ó2 They were sorted 
by date and time of response; every tenth complete response within each response category 
was selected. These 146 responses were coded thematically in NVivo. Such representative 
sub-sampling within a large sample enables manageable qualitative analysis. This article 
draws on quantitative data from the complete survey results and qualitative data from the 
sub-sample. 
Profile 
Just under one-third (31.0%) of US citizen respondents had actively thought of 
renouncing US citizenship, and 3.3% were in the process of doing so. Some 9.2% of the 
overall sample were former US citizens. It should be clear that the responses on consideration 
of renunciation are not necessarily clear statements of intention. Indeed, in comments, many 
reported that, while they had actively sought out information, they were unlikely to renounce. 
There was no substantial variation by income level (see Table 2). The sub-sample selected for 
qualitative analysis had the breakdown as presented in Table 1.   
 
 
                                                
2 The possible responses were: ÔNo, I have not thought about itÕ; ÔI have given passing thought to the ideaÕ; ÔI 
have actively thought about it and looked into it, whether through an Internet search, asking for advice, etc.Õ; 














The contrast between the World BankÕs 2010 estimate of 2.4 million overseas 
Americans and that of the State DepartmentÕs 2012 estimate of 6.3 million (and the increase 
to 9 million in 2016) reinforces the point that there is not one definitive source for the size of 
the American diaspora. All counting and profiling mechanisms are incomplete (Klekowski 
von Koppenfels and Costanzo 2013; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014; Smith 2010) and, 
while there is increasing research on the different aspects of this varied migrant population 
(Croucher 2009; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014), more research is needed.   
The plurality of respondents (32.5%) had moved to be with a partnerÑconsistent with 
previous research (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014; OVF 2009) Ñwith employment the 
second key motivator, at 26.4% of respondents. Study (10.3%) and exploration (9.6%) were 
of similar importance.  Over one-third (38.9%) had lived in their current country of residence 
for over 20 years and an additional 20.5% between 11 and 19 years. Two-thirds of all 
respondents noted that permanent return to the US is unlikely. Just under half (45.3%) 
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reported pre-tax annual household incomes of less than USD 100,000 (18.1% reported less 
than USD 50,000), and 8.0% USD 250,000 or more.3  
 The majority of overseas Americans can thus be identified as Conradson and 
LathamÕs Òmiddling migrantsÓ (2005), which provides an intermediate position between the 
ÒeliteÓ migrant and the underprivileged (Ryan et al. 2015). However, even within that 
ÒmiddlingÓ category, there remains great diversity (Klekowski von Koppenfels et al. 2015, 
614), not only in terms of income and employment,4 but also identity, integration and 
relationship to the origin country. In short, an overseas American is more likely to be a long-
term ÒmiddlingÓ migrant, a part of the ÒneglectedÓ diaspora (Ho 2011), and not the 
fabulously rich Òfat catÓ investment banker or independently wealthy scion of a well-to-do 
family often imagined by domestic US actors. Such imagination is a narrative common 
among countries without a positive diasporic outreach. Collyer notes that for such states, 
including Arab Spring nations, North Korea and Eritrea, ÒÕemigrantsÕÓ choice to live outside 
the country was alone enough to rouse suspicions of their motives É. [these insinuations] 
build on narratives of emigrants as wealthy, privileged, out of touch or corruptÓ (2013, 16). In 
the case of the American diaspora, those teaching English by the hour and well-integrated in 
the country of destination seem to outnumber those jetsetting Òelite migrantsÓ whose lifestyle 
captures the public imagination, leading us to question widespread stereotypes.  
Negative diasporic outreach: financial reporting requirements 
The United States is one of only two countries to tax its citizens on worldwide 
income. The other is Eritrea, where permission to emigrate and to return is linked to the 
payment of a two per cent annual tax (Riggan 2013, 92). All other countries use residence-
                                                
3 It should be noted that taxation rates vary substantially from one country to another, so that net income can 
have strong variation.  
4
 41.4% were full-time employed, 20.2% retired and 18.2% self-employed; 3.5% were unemployed and looking 
for work 
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based taxation (RBT). All US citizens living abroad have been required to file annual tax 
returns since 1962, whether or not tax is due.  
In addition to citizenship-based taxation (CBT), additional financial reporting 
requirements have affected overseas Americans. Passed in 2010, taking full effect in 2014, 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was passed as part of H.R. 2847, the 
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE). Intended to crack down on tax 
evasion, FATCA was meant to provide the revenue needed to fund HIRE. FATCAÕs key 
provision is that foreign banks and financial institutions must report the accounts of ÔUS 
personsÕÑUS citizens and Green Card holdersÑto the United StatesÕ Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) or face substantial penalties. ÒUS personsÓ themselves must also report these 
accounts to the US government. To avoid required reporting, many financial institutions have 
made the decision to no longer accept ÒUS personsÓ as customers and have closed existing 
accounts, denied investment opportunities and even mortgages, thus denying overseas 
Americans banking and investment services. 
 Simultaneously, enforcement of the 1970 Banking Secrecy Act (BSA), also meant to 
combat tax evasion, was increased. The BSA requires that any US citizen holding more than 
a total of $10,000 in one or more foreign accounts at any point during the year must report 
the highest annual balance of those accounts to the Department of Treasury via an annual 
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). As of 2004, penalties for Ônon-
wilful noncomplianceÕ were increased to $10,000 per account per year and enforcement 
increased. 
FATCA has been widely perceived by US citizens abroad as a negative move directly 
affecting them, with one respondent speaking of the United StatesÕ Òaggression against its 
diaspora,Ó another calling it a Òwitch-huntÓ and a third asking Òwhy do they treat people who 
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work abroad like terrorists and money launderers?Ó The Economist called FATCA Òa piece of 
extraterritoriality stunning even by WashingtonÕs standardsÓ (The Economist 28 June 2014). 
Yet the law was passed to target US-based tax evaders. Here we note not a two-tier approach 
to a diaspora, but a distinction in the stateÕs and diasporaÕs perception of the same 
phenomenon; if the state was disinterested, the diaspora perceives denunciation.  
FATCA demonstrates the extra-territorial nature of state-diaspora relations, which has 
an impact not only on US citizens, but also on foreign banks and other companies and 
organisations now charged with implementing US policy (cf. Ho and Yeoh 2015; Ragazzi 
2009, 383). The impact of FATCA is thus not only a direct state-diaspora one, but is 
mediated through destination country banks and other financial institutions. 
Implications of financial reporting requirements: citizenship renunciation 
FATCA and increased FBAR enforcement have arguably resulted in the record-high 
numbers of citizenship renunciations since FATCAÕs passage in 2010. Conventional wisdom 
has it that wealthy Americans are renouncing as a tax avoidance strategy. Yet my data (see 
Table 2) showed no substantial variation in renunciation intentions by income level. The 
decision to renounce rather involved Òwrenching emotions,Ó as one woman living in Canada 




















Have not thought about it  29.4%  32.4%  33.2%  27.9% 
Have given it passing thought  30.1%  33.2%  29.9%  29.5% 
Have thought actively about 
doing so  28.2%  31.1%  27.4%  32.8% 
Am currently in the process 
of doing so  3.0%  3.3%  3.6%  2.5% 
Have done so  9.2%  na  5.8%  7.4% 
  N=1546  N=1404  N=274  N=122 
 
emerged in my research: First, for many, the complexity and cost (of paying a tax preparer, 
and not necessarily a question of paying taxes per se) was a key motivation in renouncing. 
Second, the feeling of ÒdenunciationÓ emerged and, finally, for those well-established in 
destination countries, many holding a second passport (57.8% of the survey respondents held 
dual citizenship), increased reporting requirements negatively impacted their lives in their 
country of destination. 
Table 3: Annual Number of Renunciations* 
2008! 2009! 2010! 2011! 2012! 2013! 2014! 2015! 2016 
226! 731! 1485! 1781! 932  2999! 3415! 4279! 5411!
*Calculated from quarterly reports in the Federal Register by the Treasury Department. Does not 
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include relinquishments; there is some dispute as to the accuracy of the figures. 
 
 The first reason for renunciation was the cost of filing, translating into a measurable 
cost of US citizenship, which played a role for some, as this person recounted: ÒEvery year I 
pay about $1,000+/p.a. and about $70 postage to lodge a tax return that calculates Ò$0Ó due.Ó 
Not only cost, but complexity also emerged numerous times, often combined with other 
factors, as in the case of this woman:  
After 45 years in Canada É and nearing 70, the paperwork expectations for filing 
were becoming too complex for spouse É with our children & their families settled 
and definitely Canadian, with most of our friends/activities here, we realized we 
would not be moving back to the US. 
This sentiment was echoed by another woman who renounced, noting she Òrealized that I 
needed to renounce asap because I was finding I couldnÕt sleep at night due to the stress of 
not knowing what rules I was not complying with at great risk of enormous penalties. 
Secondly, many reported feeling targeted by the US government, with FATCA both a 
proximate and an underlying cause: ÒMore personally, I feel ill over the way we are being 
treated as presumptive criminals and that the attitude of resident Americans towards us 
appears to be Ôgood riddance.ÕÓ The increased enforcement of the FBAR was another factor, 
as expressed here: ÒFurther, I am sick of filing tax forms that make me feel like a criminal 
(the form to FINCEN5 is the final straw) even though I am living an honest life.Ó Expressions 
that the policies are Òpunishing honest people for not living in the USÓ were also strongly 
present. Levitt and Glick Schiller note that ÒAny overtures migrants make vis--vis their 
                                                
5
 FBAR has been filed online since 2013, with filers required to do so via the website of the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN). 
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ancestral home are viewed as suspect because migrants are seen as having abandoned the 
homeland or even as traitors to its causeÓ (2004, 1024); in this case, overseas Americans are 
not making overturesÑbut view themselves as the subjects of a form of negative or 
controlling outreach by the state. 
Finally, for others, US citizenship, post-FATCA, had negative impacts on their daily 
lives in their countries of destination: ÒShame, shame, shame on the US government for 
creating a situation under which renunciation became my most viable personal option. [I] had 
personal and business accounts where I live and work forcibly closed due to FATCA.Ó Both 
banking and employment were mentioned. This person noted, ÒMy fear is FATCA will limit 
my career and business opportunities and make me into a second class EU citizen.Ó Another 
noted that the policies resulted in banks changing their treatment of US customers: ÒI feel like 
I am being treated as a criminal by banking institutions.Ó The increase in US citizen 
renunciations, while still a minute percentage of all overseas Americans (the 21,000 
renunciants named by the Federal Register between 2008 and 2016 make up less than 0.2% 
of the estimated 9 million overseas Americans), does reflect a clear and significant trend. The 
significant increase in renunciations has, in turn, reinforced the popular belief that overseas 
Americans have left the countryÑand are now renouncing their citizenshipÑnot for reasons 
of partnership or employment, but rather to avoid taxation or disloyalty. The Ex-PATRIOT 
Act proposed in 2012 would have, if it had been passed into law, denied entry to the US to 
former Americans who had renounced to avoid taxation. In introducing the bill, Senator 
Charles Schumer referred to Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin, who renounced and is 
assumed to have done so for tax avoidance purposes, when he said: Òmy fellow Americans, 
when you renounce your nation to fatten your bank account, you areÑby definitionÑbeing 
greedy and unpatrioticÓ (US Congress 2012, S3549). 
American engagement and disengagement 
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Yet the majority of overseas Americans remain citizens and remain eligible to vote. 
Many do perceive a denouncing state following FATCA, yet have no plans to renounce US 
citizenshipÑas this person noted: Ò1. IÕm an American. 2. I deeply resent being treated like a 
tax fraud or a drug lord. FATCA is absurd, the penalty provisions are absurd.Ó Yet, at the 
same time, individual American politicians have identified in the diaspora both a source of 
votes and of funds. The 2000 Presidential election, famously decided by 537 votes in the state 
of Florida, highlighted the importance of absentee ballots in US federal elections (Klekowski 
von Koppenfels 2014:173), although complete counts of overseas votes remain elusive. Both 
Republican and Democratic presidential candidates have attended fund-raisers overseas since 
2007 and have sent so-called surrogates to do the same (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014, 
201; Washington Post, July 7, 2016). Indeed, overseas Americans have actively exercised 
their citizenship rights through voting, fund-raising, lobbying and protesting. Grass-roots 
lobbying won overseas Americans the right to vote in federal elections in 1975 (states may 
extend the right to vote in local and state elections, but are not required to do so) and 
facilitated transmission of citizenship to children born abroad (Klekowski von Koppenfels 
2014; Michaux 1996). The 2009 MOVE Act facilitates voting still further. This active 
participation on the part of the diaspora and their inclusion by the state, at odds with the 
negative diasporic outreachÑexclusionÑof increased financial reporting, with its result of 
increased citizenship renunciation, reflects Dlano and GamlenÕs warning that the state is not 
necessarily a unitary actor (2014, 45).  
We can explain this otherwise puzzling juxtaposition of positive and negative 
outreach, or of differentiated inclusion and exclusion, by drawing on the lens of different 
citizenship logics, namely that of inclusion in the state versus that of the nation. The 
extension of the right to voteÑextending full inclusion in the stateÑcan be understood in the 
broader logic of the then recently-concluded Civil Rights Movement, in which voting rights 
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were extended to African-Americans. Through framing their campaign for the right to vote 
and for facilitated transmission of citizenship as a question of equal rights in the state for 
overseas citizens, overseas Americans were able successfully to ÒpiggybackÓ (Rhodes and 
Harutyunyan 2010, 480) on past campaigns, including that for the extension of the franchise 
to military posted overseas (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014, 233 and 243). As Boccagni et 
al. also argue, Òin-country civil societyÓ (2016:456) thus played a key role in the extension of 
the vote to emigrants. Yet, the stateÕs unreflective action of passing FATCA, seeking to target 
domestic tax-evaders, serves to underscore the absence of the overseas population in the 
national narrative. 
Of the state, but not of the nation 
The extension of the franchise was thus not, as it has been in other cases, a shift in 
conceptual understanding of the nation to include emigrants (cf. Collyer 2014), but rather was 
extended following a normative shift in an understanding of equal rights within the context of 
citizenship domestically. Insofar, the case of the US supports GamlenÕs argument that the 
extension of rights need not be part of a coordinated diaspora engagement programme (2008, 
847). 
Overseas Americans are citizens, part of the US state, and are thus subject to the same 
responsibilities as US-based citizens (taxes and Selective Service registration) and enjoy 
rights including, for most, the right to vote and to pass US citizenship to children born 
abroad. However, there is no widespread understanding or imagination of overseas 
Americans being part of the broader American nation; the image of the overseas American is 
that of a US citizen temporarily overseas, perhaps as a student, an individual on military 
deployment, on a short-term contract or carrying out humanitarian assistance, but not as an 
emigrant or long-term resident abroad. It is this contrast between the conventional wisdom 
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and the reality of the profile of overseas Americans which results in overseas Americans 
having additional financial reporting requirements vis--vis their compatriots based in the 
US. Democrats Abroad, the overseas arm of the Democratic party, sees itself as the Ô51st 
stateÕ and indeed sends delegates to the Democratic National Convention as a state (unlike 
Republicans Overseas, which is not similarly institutionalised within the Republican Party). 
This is not, however, replicated on a national level. Again, HoÕs concept of the ÔneglectedÕ 
diaspora comes to mind. 
Not seen as a distinct or permanent population, overseas Americans are not included 
in the decennial census. One survey respondent noted that Òbecause we arenÕt present in the 
US we donÕt countÓ Ñthis is felt to be the case not only figuratively, but literally as well. A 
broad coalition of overseas American advocacy groups lobbied in the 1990s to be included in 
the 2000 US Census, in part to demonstrate their strength of numbers and thus political 
power: Òin an era of close elections, politicians pay attention to their constituents; insofar, 
having an accurate count of Americans overseas could further lobbying goalsÓ (Klekowski 
von Koppenfels 2014, 251), also pointing to a lack of representation and a question of 
fairness. Success in achieving a test census in 2004 was tempered by the testÕs conclusions 
that inclusion of overseas citizens in the census faced significant challenges, not the least of 
which was poor cost effectiveness (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014, 253). Overseas 
Americans were not included in the 2010 Census.  
The Department of the TreasuryÑnot the State Department, and not the US Census 
BureauÑoversees the increased financial reporting. FATCA sought to find those Òwho game 
the system;Ó Senator Max Baucus, introducing the bill in 2009, noted: ÒThe bill gives the IRS 
powerful tools to find US taxpayers who are hiding their money in offshore accountsÓ (US 
Congress 2009, S10785). The law was not addressing 9 million (then estimated by the State 
Department at 5.3 million (Smith 2010)) overseas Americans, but rather the Òup to 52,000 
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individuals [who] hid billions of dollars in offshore accounts through UBSÓ (US Congress 
2009, S10785). Ending Òoffshore tax evasionÓ was the goal, with wealthy US-based Òfat catÓ 
tax evaders the intended target, not millions of middle-class overseas Americans, such as this 
woman: ÒI'm not the person they were aiming for. I'm self-employed, and earn under $20,000 
a year. I can't even afford to renounce now [with the fee now $2350] Ñthough I am fully 
compliant with tax and would face no penaltyÑand it's ridiculous.Ó Such contrasting 
facilitation of rights and exercise of control reflects a merging of the domestic and external 
spheres, with Òthe interlocking components of national citizenshipÓ being Òselectively 
reassigned to diaspora populationsÓ (Ho and Yeoh 2015, 154). In this case, the selectivity is 
reflected in the inclusion of diaspora in the state as US citizens, but exclusion from the 
national narrative. They are subject to duties as citizens, but not accorded any status as 
overseas citizens or diaspora members, but are subject even to additional duties. 
While the facilitation of rights and the exercise of control, or ÒgoverningÓ (Gamlen et 
al. this issue) may be treated and seen separately within different Departments of the US 
government, they are not necessarily seen as separate issues by US citizens living abroad. 
This woman who has lived in Australia since 1995 said: ÒI canceled my [voter] registration in 
2013 due to being treated as a second-class citizen, and a presumed criminal/tax evader 
(guilty until proven innocent), by the US government (IRS, Treasury).Ó She explicitly chose 
abstention in a direct protest to her perception of having other civil rights restricted; in the 
absence of complete inclusionÑincluding both rights and recognitionÑshe chose to abstain.  
ÒInformal AmbassadorsÓ or ÒSuspicious personÓ? 
Levitt and Glick Schiller note that diaspora Òmovement and attachment is not linear or 
sequential but capable of rotating back and forth and changing direction over time: (2004, 
1011). For overseas Americans, FATCA has had a clear impact upon their attachment to the 
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state. While the contradiction between facilitating the right to vote for US citizens living 
abroad and mechanisms to root out tax evaders may not be evident to those within the US 
government, it is seen as denunciation by many overseas Americans, as noted by this 
respondent: ÒMany Americans abroad feel a deep sense of betrayal.Ó Another noted that this 
betrayal is seen as particularly strong in the face of a lack of recognition as an overseas 
American: ÒOur contact with the US is usually through the Embassy or Consulate in the 
country which we reside. Yet we are not seen as members of the US community, actually 
treated as foreign clients within these agencies.Ó This reflects Levitt and Glick SchillerÕs 
point that the disinterested, denouncing state Òtreat[s] migrants as if they no longer belong to 
their homelandÓ (2004, 1024). 
Ragazzi notes that some governments have a stance vis--vis their diasporas of 
Òconsider[ing] anyone who leaves, or stays abroad, at best ÔsuspiciousÕ or at worst a ÔtraitorÕÓ 
(Ragazzi 2009:386), thinking of Kurdish emigrants from Turkey or Serbian or Croat 
emigrants from then-Yugoslavia. This American survey respondent had a similar perception: 
ÒIt really boils down to being made to feel like a suspicious person simply because I live 
elsewhere and therefore have a foreign bank account.Ó Another respondent drew a broader 
picture, saying: Òliving outside of the United States puts you, in the eyes of the government, 
in the position of someone not to be trusted and also makes you into a second rate citizen.Ó  
Survey respondents reported having often acted as informal ambassadors (Klekowski 
von Koppenfels 2015), explaining and giving context to widely disseminated American 
culture and foreign policy actions. As this person stated simply: Òwe ARE the face of the US 
abroad.Ó While State Department officials may well draw on individual overseas Americans 
with whom they happen to have contact, there is no systematic outreach to Americans living 
abroad by the Department of State. Having explained and defended US policy over the years, 
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overseas Americans have not had their position as informal amassadors recognised, and feel 
that lack of recognition as abandonment:  
There seems to be no representation of our viewpoints, positions, or interests-- and 
little done to support us as Americans abroad. It would seem to me that the US State 
Department would be better served to embrace the American Expat community within 
their activities. 
During the Iraq War, starting in 2003, which was unpopular and sharply criticised in 
Europe, Americans living abroad often responded to and refuted criticisms of the US 
government, in the process strengthening their own sense of being American and becoming 
more politically engaged (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014, 208). The passage of FATCA, 
however, has nullified that sense of engagement for many, leading to a sense of 
disillusionment (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2015), as expressed by this man, living in Japan, 
who has given passing thought to renouncing: 
I was a good ambassador for America as I progressed through my career. Now [post-
FATCA] I feel as though I am victimized by the idea that an American living outside 
America must prove he is not a criminal. The problem is there is no mechanism by 
which to achieve that. I am disappointed and angry. 
We may even be seeing the emergence of a diasporic identity among overseas Americans. 
Butler argues that the Òconstruct of the homelandÉfunctions as the constituting basis of 
collective diasporan identityÓ (2001, 204, italics in original) and, further, that Òdiasporan 
representations of the homeland are part of the project of constructing diasporan identityÓ 
(205). FATCA is thus simultaneously an extraterritorial extension of domestic law and may 
be a catalyst for the construction of a diasporic identity.  
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Taxation without representation 
Once the rallying cry of American colonists, Òtaxation without representationÓ is 
today widely used among overseas American advocates who seek collective representation. 
Although, as discussed above, overseas Americans lobbied for and received the vote in 1975, 
they refer to a lack of representatives elected solely by overseas Americans. France, Italy or 
Algeria have dedicated representatives for their emigrant population, but overseas Americans 
vote in their last state of residence, such as New York or California, and thus cannot speak 
electorally with one collective diasporic voice. With an estimated 9 million US citizens living 
abroad, they would, if they were a state, be more numerous than forty of the fifty states. 
Overseas American lobbying and votes have increased a number of individual legislatorsÕ 
awareness of overseas Americans as voters and potential donors, yet institutional or national 
recognition of overseas Americans as a constituency has not emerged, despite the efforts of 
the 22-member House Americans Abroad Caucus. 
This man living in Norway, referring to the dedicated seats for French ÒexpatrisÓ in 
the French Senate and Parliament, expressed the perceived voicelessness: 
As an American expat, I feel little support from the government, and indeed often feel 
as if I am being penalized or criminalized (by things like FATCA) for living overseas. 
I don't feel as if expats have a voice in the government. The feeling is compounded 
when I hear about how countries like France support their expats. 
The simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of overseas Americans is expressed by this person: 
ÒI think the lack of dedicated and explicit legislative representation of Americans who live 
overseas is profoundly unfair and amounts to Ôtaxation without representation.ÕÓ Bound 
individually by financial control legislation applying to overseas Americans, he expresses 
frustration at the lack of a collective voice. 
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Conclusion 
 Remaining strong in its self-identification an immigration country, the United 
StatesÑgovernment and population alikeÑstruggle with the concept of American emigrants 
or diaspora. The stateÕs lack of recognition of overseas Americans as members of the 
American nation, as part of the national imagination, was a key factor in the passage of 
FATCA. Designed to target US-based Òfat catsÓ investing millions abroad, the drafters of the 
legislation did not consider the impact on overseas AmericansÑthe ÒneglectedÓ diaspora of a 
ÒdisinterestedÓ state. Millions of Òmiddling migrantsÓ Ñoverseas AmericansÑhave, 
however, been negatively affected by the repercussions of FATCA, including closed bank 
accounts, with many in the American diaspora perceiving this legislation as a ÒdenouncingÓ 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) act on the part of the US government.  
Indeed, a 20-fold increase in citizenship renunciations from 2008 to 2016 reflects the 
American diasporaÕs reaction. The increase in renunciations suggests a decrease in popular 
sovereignty and a withdrawal of the consent to be governed; the stateÕs demonstrated 
exclusion of an American diaspora from the American nation has led to sharply increasing 
numbers of those choosing to exclude themselves from the state as well. Many moreÑthe 
vast majorityÑare not renouncing, but nonetheless feel neglected (cf. Ho 2011) or 
denounced by the state as well. Negative diasporic outreach in the American case reflects the 
same mechanism as in cases of positive diasporic outreachÑthe inclusion in Òunderstandings 
of the peopleÓ or the nation is crucial (Collyer 2013, 14). Yet the long-term American 
emigrantÑthe Òneglected emigrantÓ Ñis identified primarily by stereotype, whether draft-
dodger, tax evader or living in the lap of luxury. In part because of this misidentification, an 
American diaspora is not included in the American social contract, either implicitly or 
explicitly, and are not seen as full citizens. Inclusion of overseas populations in the national 
self-understanding is a prerequisite for complete inclusion and is, in this case, absent.  
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Ragazzi noted that Òwhile governmental practices toward ÔtheirÕ populations abroad 
can be contradictory and confused, they can be made more intelligible through an 
understanding of the broader material, intellectual, and political contexts in which they 
emergeÓ (2009, 391). The seeming contradiction of the US caseÑextension of the vote and 
continued facilitation of that vote on one hand, and financial restrictions on the otherÑis 
resolved by an of the state, but not of the nation understanding; overseas Americans are 
understood to be temporarily abroad, with those who are ÒemigrantsÓ in any permanent sense 
being Òneglected.Ó  
The case of the United States sheds light on our understanding of these ÒindifferentÓ 
or ÒdisinterestedÓ states through the many state-diaspora contradictions in value, positioning 
and identity. The diaspora may see itself as playing the role of Òinformal ambassadors,Ó 
representing and even defending sometimes unpopular American foreign policy actions, yet 
the state does not recognise the diaspora as representing any form of soft power or being of 
value to the stateÕs interests (cf. Mylonas and Žilović this issue). Diaspora members have 
seen themselves as proud Americans, yet long-term state disinterest and recent legislation 
which many perceive as denunciation reinforces their perception that they are not a valued 
part of the nation, in turn resulting in a shift away, as represented by increasing renunciation 
figures and other concerns. Included in considerable domestic policyÑtaxation, financial 
reporting, policies cracking down on tax evasion, but also votingÑthey are nonetheless not 
part of the Òimagined communityÓ (Anderson 2006) that makes up a nation. Unlike HaitiÕs 
Òtenth departmentÓ (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999), there is no recognition of an American 
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